The exercises were held to meet “Requirements for Facility Interaction Plan in Case of Sabotage” approved by Order of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine dated 22 November 2010.
The key objective of command staff exercises was to test “Facility Interaction Plan in Case of Sabotage at Chornobyl NPP”.
For these exercises Military Unit No.3041 of the National Guard of Ukraine, ChNPP Office of Security Service Main Office in Kyiv City and Kyiv Region, Administrative Department of the State Agency of Ukraine on Exclusion Zone Management, ChNPP Zone Police Division of the National Police Main Office in Kyiv Region, 11-SFRT of State Emergency Service of Ukraine in Kyiv Region, Zhytomyr Border Guard Attachment of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine were involved.
The participants of the command staff exercises tested and validated the efficient performance of communication, timeliness of alert notice for the participants of the interaction plan, providing under unified leadership the viable management of the forces within interaction plan in the course of the their mission accomplishment.
Summarizing the results of the exercises Deputy Director General for Physical Protection Regime Valentyn Viter thanked all Interaction Plan participants for their active engagement in it. He expressed hope that it would be not necessary to use the gained knowledge and skills in real life but only during such exercises.
For information
As per Law of Ukraine “On Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Materials, Radioactive Waste, Other Ionising Radiation Sources”, “Regulations for Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Materials” (NP 306.8.126-2006), “General Requirements for Physical Protection Systems of Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear materials” (NP 306.8.146-2008), “Requirements for Site Interaction Plan in Case of Sabotage” (NP 306.8.165-2010) a site interaction plan in case of sabotage is developed and implemented for every nuclear facility (site).
The tasks of site interaction plan in case of sabotage (hereinafter referred to as: Interaction Plan) are as follows:
1. To ensure a successful counteraction to any attempt of transgressors of the law, whose characteristics are specified in the site design basis threat, to commit sabotage, to steal some nuclear material, radioactive waste, other ionizing radiation sources, other illegal acts with regard to the site.
2. To avert any meetings, rallies, demonstrations or other public events within the site area and its controlled access area.
3. To prevent organizing and to stop rallies, demonstrations, picketing, blocking the transportation lines or any other public events outside the site territory and its controlled access area if such events can cause the disruption of the site system operational capability.
Efficiency and relevance of a site interaction plan are tested by command staff exercises, special tactical training exercises and battle exercises of the interaction plan participants.
As per Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 12.03.2003 No.327 “On Approval of Procedure for State Examination of Physical Protection Systems for Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Materials, Radioactive Waste, Other Ionising Radiation Sources and Interaction Plans in case of Nuclear Terrorism Acts” the aim within such state examination of physical protection systems and interaction plans is to identify if the status of site physical protection is in line with the legislative requirements.